如何评价图中这艘航空战列舰的可行性和战术价值？ 第1页

泻药，但是我从来就没有理解过为什么要把BB和CV混合在一起。现实中诸多混合舰计划都没有成形是有理由的。

如果要CV的话，用快速邮轮去改，用商船去改，或者直接建造都可以。航母真的没有那么贵。之前引用过质询，即便是舰队航母的造价只有主力舰的一半，所需要的材料和技术工更是完全无法相比。真的存在舰队航母都能产能不足的情况下绝对不会还有余力造主力舰。类似于法方在30年代初集中力量突击主力舰放弃其他项目的作法都是政策/技术原因。

而且这两者本质上就不是一种东西。现代化主力舰有可以硬接航弹的水平防御，有对重炮可见的免疫区。这些东西之所以存在是为了对抗投弹和炮击的，不是为了装在船上空增重量的。载机舰本质上不应该放在会集火炮击被集中投弹的环境里。混合以后的结果是什么呢？带着航空设备和机库去和敌舰对射？还是为了这点可怜的航空能力牺牲一艘重炮舰的部署灵活性和防空/反雷击能力？这种东西是没有什么‘重炮舰的威慑力’的。其与真正主力舰对射永远有更多忌惮（航空设施），与真正的载机舰对抗的时候，这种东西就是邀请所有的航空兵集中打击，却既没有真正载机舰的CAP能力也没有真正炮舰的A/A火力。

理论上把船建成真正的载机舰或者真正的航母效率都会更高，就这么简单。

实际情况来说，法国航母的后续舰（1938舰队航母，2艘Joffre）的问题是39年出现的。具体来说，38年MN订购了2艘33节航母，然后到了39年的时候发现1艘只完工了不到三分之一，1艘彻底没有开工。而39年黎塞留下水了。

现在如果君为达朗，应该改黎塞留吗？

绝对不应该。

在整个30年代后期盟军（or英军）都在难以维持主力舰均势的焦虑中。而这一点到了1940年发展到了内阁认为德日意三国的总和将拥有两倍于RN主力舰（并且有更高比例新舰/延寿舰）的情况。我记得发过40年底内阁情报汇总的结果。此时盟军最大的缺口被认为是主力舰（而不是护航舰，也不是巡洋舰和航母）。此前两年里大规模延误主力舰工期换来的2队战时紧急计划驱逐舰的选择现在被认为不再合适了：

简单汇总一下，仅仅考虑舰队航母和主力舰，对日德作战需要的航母底线是14艘，日本不参战时对德意则是12艘。此时舰队有7（计算阿古斯），41年即将达到9。而在主力舰上，‘到1942年底，德国和意大利总计可能会有15艘装备11in以上主炮的舰艇’，其中7艘可能是新舰。而‘即便是德意舰队可以在我军不遭受任何损失的情况下被摧毁，1942年我们将面对一支和我军主力舰队一样庞大的日本舰队，其中有和我军新舰数量相同的吨位至少35000吨的新舰’，这里指的是日军可能有18艘主力舰，其中包括4艘大和，4艘‘新式装备了12in主炮的快速重型装甲巡洋舰，每艘都需要1艘35000吨战列舰或者胡德或者声望（不包括反击hence）来对抗’。

这个数字当然严重高估了日德意三者的造舰能力。但是这是法国沦陷时内阁决定战或降的讨论，其焦虑的真实性毫无疑虑。盟军此时真真正正地相信到了42年时海面上有33艘轴心国战列舰，其中11艘是新舰，其他是比盟军改造舰更优秀的延寿舰和只有KGV/胡德才能对抗的‘12in日本快速重型装甲巡洋舰’。相比起此时英法对德意8:0的舰队航母对比（注意日本参战时很有可能美国的载机舰队也将参战），主力舰上的缺口远要大得多得多。

在30年代末这样的大环境里，把1艘已经下水的高速新式15in舰拿去改航母，是不合理的。黎塞留太宝贵了。如果要改，用其他东西改。比如断然无法完工的那些。

真的想要航母，战争早期的解决方式一直是把赫尔墨斯贴过来。法国能够为战争做出来的更大的贡献，就是把黎塞留身上那二百万个技术问题比史实更早地解决掉。

或者——额，‘不要输掉巴黎’。

当所有人都考虑过全通甲板的航空战列舰，却没有人真的去实施的时候，大概就能知道这种东西到底有多大用处了。

护航航母为什么叫护航航母是有原因的，我们来算一笔账。

我们有一艘博格，24架的机库容量。

最低限度的cap需要4架战斗机，2架high，2架low，还需要4架轮班，一共8架。

反潜巡逻至少需要4架。

机库容量至少有一半不能动，这还是在最极限的，完全不考虑完备率的情况下。

实际上博格在空中威胁比较严重的太平洋都是靠把飞机摆甲板上超载到30架，18个F4F和12个TBF，再额外多几架备用机。

地中海的情况比太平洋只会更加恶劣，源源不断的陆基轰炸机和严重的潜艇威胁，RN航母因为载机量的问题无法同时保持足够数量的cap和反潜巡逻吃过太多大亏（比如第一代航母鹰就被U73雷死了），一度被迫将主力撤出地中海。

这种只有护航航母基本航空运作能力的大吨位舰艇别说成为舰队的航空支柱了，连最基本的自保能力都要打上一个问号，特别是自身防空火力基本为0的情况下。

至于打击能力，即便是TBF这样起降性能优秀的轰炸机，顶着25节甲板风，在挂上鱼雷之后也至少需要140米的跑道才能飞起来，而即便是卡萨布兰卡的飞行甲板长度也只有145米（博格130）。这也是护航航母在火箭助推投入使用之前无法运作重载机的原因。而SBD就更别想了，即便是只挂一颗500磅，也需要150米的跑道。这就别说deck load了，总不能一个deck load就两架鱼雷机带几架轻载战斗机吧？

既然没有打击能力，那就得靠自己的主炮去打击。

先不说开炮会不会把飞行甲板掀了的问题，也不考虑高大的上层建筑给对面炮术官省了多少事，真正的问题反倒抛给了自己人：如果对面来了一支小船舰队，我该不该去打？

高速的巡洋舰间的战斗非常常见，在地中海更是如此。假如意大利人的巡洋舰队来揍你的巡洋舰了，你的巡洋舰不占上风，你该不该去支援呢？

如果不上，巡洋舰对战不占优势，还不如正规航母拥有打击能力可以助阵。

如果上，投影面积巨大的航空设施吃了一发炮弹，里面的飞机至少少了一半，整个舰队的航空能力几乎归零，面对接下来可能的陆基轰炸还不如有足够防空火力的正规战列舰有用。

所以，何必呢？真要改一个应急的舰队轻航，去改个高速客轮，或者改现成的德格拉斯不香吗？（德国人还真有打算把德格拉斯改成航母）

反正都“不要输掉巴黎”了不是吗 ╮(╯▽╰)╭

重新发明轮子。

懒得吐槽那些构想内容，但这种设计本来就是史实上有过的。

档案号ADM 1/11324，看看人家是如何论述的，当然你们也可以试着反驳一下人家的这些观点。

另外做一点补充：1936年RN讨论了航母用于贸易保护任务的相关问题，当时认为一个中队15架TSR飞机就已经够用。可以作为【On the trade routes a T.S.R. squadron could be carried, thereby turning the ship into a self-contained hunting group】这句话的一个补充，帮助理解。

把重点放前面：

3. To build additional small carriers for service with the battle fleet is in many ways the simpler solution from the constructive point of view, but it involves a number of marked disadvantages:–

(i) Vulnerability of small carriers to surface, air or submarine attack, owing to their inability on the displacement to carry the deck armour or underwater protection of the capital ship.

(ii) Necessity for additional screening destroyers, due to the increase in number of units in the battleship group.

(iii) Probability of carriers and heavy ships becoming separated under difficult flying or navigational conditions, resulting in danger to the carrier from surface attack, and less effective operation of the protective fighter.

认为CVL就能解决问题的，先反驳这几点再说吧。

Projected design of a Battle Carrier

Modern conditions of warfare, under which capital ships may

frequently be called upon to operate within reach of enemy shore-based

aircraft, require fighter protection to be immediately available at all times,

on notice equal to the warning which can be given by up to date R.d.f.

equipment as there seems no reason to assume that a.a. fire alone will

ever be able to provide the full measure of security required.

2. there are clearly two ways in which such fighter protection can be

provided:–

(i) from a carrier in company with each capital ship or group of

capital ships.

(ii) by carrying fighters in each capital ship.

3. To build additional small carriers for service with the battle fleet is in many ways the simpler solution from the constructive point of view, but it involves a number of marked disadvantages:–

(i) Vulnerability of small carriers to surface, air or submarine attack, owing to their inability on the displacement to carry the deck armour or underwater protection of the capital ship.

(ii) Necessity for additional screening destroyers, due to the increase in number of units in the battleship group.

(iii) Probability of carriers and heavy ships becoming separated under difficult flying or navigational conditions, resulting in danger to the carrier from surface attack, and less effective operation of the protective fighter.

4. all these considerations point to the necessity for including fighters

in the defensive equipment of future capital ships, if this can be achieved

without serious prejudice to the offensive power of the main armament.

5. on a.M. 7444/40 it was proposed to investigate the question of

carrying not less than twelve fighters in a future capital ship. an

investigation has now been carried out by d.n.c. of the application of the

principle to vessels of the lion class, accepting the existing hull design

and positions of main armament turrets.

6. from this investigation it appeared that the maximum possible length

of flying deck which could be provided between b and X turrets would

fall short by nearly 100 feet of the minimum length required for operating

fighters or, with assisted take off, reconnaissance aircraft.

7. the next expedient suggested was to group the main armament as in

nelson class, and this proposal is in fact being worked out. With this

arrangement however the flying deck battleship seems likely to reach a

displacement of 50,000 to 55,000 tons which, both on grounds of

manoeuvrability and of docking facilities, is considered to be out of the

question.

8. in fact it appears that neither of these arrangements, i.e. three turrets

in two groups or three turrets in one group, will meet requirements on a

reasonable displacement, and that to solve this problem the fact must be

accepted that the number of main armament turrets must be limited to

two.

9. if only two main armament turrets are carried it is clear that they

would have to be quadruple in order to maintain a minimum of eight guns.

this leads to a layout somewhat similar to the french battle cruisers, all

of which have two quadruple turrets forward, dunKeRQue class 13.4ʺ

and Richelieu class 15ʺ. Given this arrangement there seems no

reason why the entire after part of the ship should not be built on island

carrier lines, the secondary armament being of a type suitable for

arranging in carrier fashion.

10. an outline sketch, which is of course in no sense a design, is

attached (see p. 368), to show the proportion of two 15ʺ quadruple turrets

on a standard displacement of 35,000 tons. a flying deck and island have

been added to give some impression of what a ship of the type under

consideration might look like.

11. as far as calibre is concerned, 16ʺ was chosen for lion class in

view of its superiority in hitting power over the 15ʺ, once the Japanese

had made it clear that they had no intention of following our lead in

reducing to a future maximum of 14ʺ. furthermore, the americans have

made it clear that they intend to stick to the 16ʺ for their future

battleships.

12. in view of our new relationship with the u.s.a. it might perhaps be

concluded that we have no need to build 16ʺ ships in addition to theirs

and that we could confine ourselves to 14ʺ, which would render our future battlefleet homogeneous as regards ammunition, or to 15ʺ which would

enable us to employ our largest ammunition reserves to advantage.

13. as regards mounting design, the 14ʺ quadruple is immediately

available and is understood to be satisfactory. the french have developed

a 15ʺ quadruple which was inspected and favourably reported upon by

the c.i.G.M., engineer Rear admiral little, in March, 1940. no 16ʺ

quadruple design as yet exists, but it does not at first sight seem out of the

question, provided the weight, about half as much again as a 14ʺ

quadruple, can be supported. as regards size the estimated barbette

diameter is of the order of 44ft compared with 41ft. 6 ins. for the 14ʺ quad.

and 39ft. for the 16ʺ triple.

14. The flight deck and hangar arrangement should enable at least 12 fighters and 2 T.S.Rs as fleet spotters to be operated when the ship is in narrow waters and exposed to air attack. On the trade routes a T.S.R. squadron could be carried, thereby turning the ship into a self-contained hunting group.

15. to sum up the advantages and disadvantages of such a ship

compared with the lion design:–

advantages

(i) fighter protection, air reconnaissance or an air striking force

would always be immediately available.

(ii) the highly vulnerable carrier would acquire the deck and

underwater protection of a capital ship.

(iii) Requirements for screening craft would be reduced.

disadvantages

(i) astern fire from the main armament would have to be sacrificed.

(ii) the number of main armament guns would be reduced by one,

and the calibre might have to be reduced.

(iii) the main armament ‘eggs’ would be in two ‘baskets’ only

instead of three. this is discounted to a certain extent by the heavy

protection and internal sub-division of, for example, the french 15ʺ

quadruple turret.

(iv) the risk of fire might be increased, though hangar fires neither

in aRK Royal nor in illustRious gave rise to serious risk to

the ship.

16. on balance d. of P. prefers a squadron of aircraft to the 9th main

armament gun, and, now that a further delay has had to be accepted in the

construction of the lion class, recommends that the possibility of a

complete re-design should be seriously considered.

17. such re-design should be based on 2 quadruple turrets, 16 ha/la

guns and a 400ft. flying deck, on a standard displacement of the order of

40,000 tons. scale of protection to be against 16ʺ attack and alternative legends to be prepared with main armament calibres of 14ʺ, 15ʺ and 16ʺ.

in addition it would be desirable to have a legend embodying two 16ʺ

triple mountings for which new designs are already well advanced.

secondary armament should be 5.25 calibre, but 4.5 might be considered

if it made all the difference between success and failure of the design.

18. submitted for consideration, d.n.a.d. and d.t.s.d. having concurred in the proposals advanced.

懒得编辑格式了，凑合看吧